

Detailed Guide to Climate Policy

Our aim is keeping global temperature increase well below 2°C, with good certainty. From there, we have identified the required emission reductions and other elements needed in a climate agreement to prevent climate catastrophe.

We ranked [industrialised country leaders](#) based on which of the following items they want in the treaty:

Criteria	Why	Scoring
Emission Reduction Targets		
Scientifically adequate emission reductions from industrialised countries as a group.	<p>According to the latest report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), industrialised country emissions must be cut by between 25% and 40% from 1990 levels by 2020, to give a 50% likelihood of keeping temperature rise below 2°C (450 ppm CO₂ equivalent stabilisation scenario).</p> <p>Greenpeace is calling for leaders to pursue pathways that give a much higher chance of staying below 2°C. In industrialised countries this means cuts of at least 40% below 1990 levels by 2020.</p> <p>In the 2007 UN climate negotiations in Vienna governments agreed that the IPCC 25-40% range should guide industrialised country target-setting, so any proposals for a group target that falls short of even this range accrues zero points.</p>	<p>3 points for supporting 40% or more reductions for industrialised countries by 2020 in aggregate.</p> <p>2 points for supporting 30% or more reductions for industrialised countries by 2020 in aggregate.</p> <p>1 point for supporting 25% or more reductions for industrialised countries by 2020 in aggregate.</p> <p>0 points For supporting less than 25% reductions for industrialised countries by 2020 in aggregate, or for refusing to define a group aim at all.</p>

Emission reductions that have to be delivered domestically	<p>The Kyoto Protocol allows industrialised countries to meet a portion of their emission reductions using carbon credits or offsets. Some governments are tempted to postpone domestic emission reductions and rely on buying (often questionable) emission permits from 'somebody else'.</p> <p>Currently the provisions of the Kyoto Protocol require countries to make more than half of their emission reductions domestically. In order to improve the environmental integrity of the Protocol in its next round, the requirement for domestic action needs to be strengthened.</p>	<p>3 points for driving for significant improvements to the current additionality principle in the Kyoto Protocol.</p> <p>2 points for defending at least the existing additionality principle in the Kyoto Protocol.</p> <p>1 point for not ensuring that the majority of actions will be met domestically, or for not having a position.</p> <p>0 points for stating that the majority of reductions will not be met domestically.</p>
Financing for a deal		
Developed nations to fund action in developing nations	<p>As the ones most responsible for long-lived emissions that are already in the atmosphere, for still producing most emissions per person and for having most capacity to act but relatively less to lose, it falls to developed nations to fund developing country action to build climate-friendly economies, end tropical deforestation and adapt to the already irreversible impacts of warming.</p> <p>Greenpeace estimates funding needs of developing countries for clean and sustainable energy technology, forest protection and adaptation to be <i>at least</i> \$140 billion (US dollars) annually in the near future.</p> <p>According to recent studies this is a very conservative estimation. Therefore, a climate leader would support a joint industrialised country commitment of <i>at least</i> \$140 billion annually, during the next phase of the Kyoto Protocol.</p>	<p>3 points for industrialised countries to fund developing country climate action with at least \$140 billion (US dollars) a year from public sources.</p> <p>2 points for industrialised countries to fund developing country climate action with at least \$70 billion a year from public sources.</p> <p>1 point for industrialised countries to fund developing country climate action with at least \$35 billion a year from public sources.</p> <p>0 points for industrialised countries to fund developing country climate action with less than \$35 billion a year, or for still not having a position.</p>
Mechanisms to ensure that	Experience in international climate and development politics has	3 points for legally binding support obligations

finance commitments are delivered	<p>shown that funding pledges by industrialised countries are often not delivered. Therefore the Copenhagen agreement needs to establish mechanisms to ensure that finance commitments are delivered. They need to be legally binding and enforceable and, insofar as possible, independent from annual budget speculations on a national level.</p> <p>Including legally binding support obligations in the Copenhagen agreement, requiring industrialised countries to buy a portion of their emission permits (in an international auction) and establishing an international finance mechanism related to bunker fuels would provide strong certainty for delivering the finance commitments.</p>	<p>for industrialised countries. International auctioning of emission permits and a finance mechanism related to international aviation and maritime fuels.</p> <p>2 points for supporting legally binding support obligations and/or international auctioning.</p> <p>1 point for supporting finance mechanism related to bunker fuels as international finance.</p> <p>0 points for general pledges only. No 'automatic' funding generation mechanisms and no legally binding support obligations.</p>
No double-counting of development aid money or offsetting of funding	<p>Funding to adapt to climate change won't help if it comes at the expense of existing support for developing nations. There should be no double-counting of offsetting of funds in the final deal.</p>	<p>3 points for industrialised country finance commitments adequate and independent of carbon market assumptions and with measures ensuring additionality to overseas development aid (ODA).</p> <p>2 points for industrialised country finance commitments adequate and independent of carbon market assumptions and double-counting of ODA recognised as an issue that has to be tackled</p> <p>1 point for carbon market flows being counted towards developing country finance needs but not towards A1 finance commitments. Double-counting of ODA recognised as an issue that has to be tackled</p> <p>0 points for offsetting flows counted towards finance commitments by industrialised countries. No firewalls to prevent ODA double-counting, or no position at all.</p>

Forest Protection			
An ambitious forest protection goal	<p>Tropical deforestation causes 20% of greenhouse gas emissions, while destroying nature's most effective carbon capture and storage mechanism.</p> <p>Ancient forests are home to millions and a haven for nature's diversity of plants and animals.</p> <p>Greenpeace is calling for a funding mechanism that will end net deforestation by ensuring forests are worth more intact than destroyed. This should achieve zero deforestation by 2015 in priority areas, such as the Amazon, the Congo Basin, and the Paradise forests of Indonesia and Papua New Guinea, and bring net emissions from deforestation to zero by 2020.</p>	<p>3 points for a global goal to end tropical deforestation and related emissions by 2020 (conditional to adequate funding from industrialised countries).</p> <p>2 points for a global goal to cut tropical deforestation and related emissions by at least two thirds by 2020 (conditional to adequate funding from industrialised countries)</p> <p>1 point for a global goal to halve tropical deforestation and related emissions by 2020 (conditional to adequate funding from industrialised countries).</p> <p>0 points for no global goal for ending tropical deforestation and related emissions.</p>	
Ensuring real and additional climate benefits	<p>The emission cuts needed to prevent catastrophic climate change are so big that we cannot choose to save forests but continue polluting. Emission reduction from ending tropical deforestation cannot become an excuse to avoid real emission cuts in industrialised nations.</p> <p>Industrialised countries must adopt forest protection funding commitments on top of their emission reduction targets.</p> <p>Furthermore, distribution of funding should be based on national plans and national accounting instead of project-by-project funding and accounting, which simply leads to logging companies shifting their destructive activities elsewhere.</p>	<p>3 points for non-offsets financing, national accounting.</p> <p>2 points for non-offsets financing. National and sub-national approach.</p> <p>1 point for both non-offsets and offsets financing. National approach.</p> <p>0 points for a majority of funding through market offsets. National plans and sub-national projects can generate offset credits.</p>	

Ensuring biodiversity within forest protection	<p>Tropical forests are essential to life; they keep climate in check, regulate water flow, and maintain the healthy ecosystems on which humanity depends.</p> <p>The forest protection mechanism established as a part of the Copenhagen agreement must not treat tropical forests only as carbon sinks. It needs to have a clear distinction between primary and secondary forests and plantations and forest protection activities must be directed at preserving biological diversity.</p>	<p>3 points for a clear distinction between primary and secondary forests and plantations. Direction of REDD activities at preserving biological diversity. Strong safeguards to prevent conversion of natural forests to plantations in the name of REDD.</p> <p>2 points for a clear distinction between primary and secondary forests and plantations. Direction of REDD activities at preserving biological diversity.</p> <p>1 point for unclear distinction between primary and secondary forests and plantations. Uncertainty as to where money would go.</p> <p>0 points for no distinction between primary and secondary forests and plantations. Direction of REDD activities at sustainable forests management, conservation and plantations.</p>
Guaranteeing the rights of indigenous peoples	<p>150 million indigenous people live in ancient forests worldwide. All too often they have been sidelined or subjected to human rights abuses by those intruding in their forests.</p> <p>Indigenous peoples need to have their futures secured so they can remain guardians of the forest. A climate deal must recognise and respect their rights, and directly engage local peoples in the development and implementation of its processes.</p>	<p>3 points for indigenous peoples' and other forest-dependent communities' rights being fully respected, and them being recognised as full participants in the design and implementation of REDD mechanism.</p> <p>2 points for indigenous peoples' and other forest-dependent communities' rights, as well as their participation, mentioned with indications of how these rights will be respected.</p> <p>1 point for indigenous peoples' and other forest-dependent communities' rights, as well as their participation, mentioned but no indication of how these rights will be respected.</p> <p>0 points for the rights of indigenous peoples and other forest-dependent communities not being respected.</p>
A binding agreement		
The agreement must be legally	Pledges won't save the climate. What we need is legally binding	3 points for supporting a legally binding

binding	<p>commitments and compliance mechanisms that have the power to impose penalties.</p> <p>The commitments for all industrialised countries must be comparable in legal nature, and have the same rules for measurement, reporting and verification. Otherwise, comparing different actions and verifying compliance will become extraordinarily complex.</p> <p>The Kyoto Protocol architecture provides a good basis for this, and needs to be preserved. It took 10 years to negotiate the Kyoto Protocol and get it into force; there is no time to start lengthy negotiations about architectural issues all over again.</p>	<p>outcome from both negotiation tracks (1 or 2 protocols), keeping the Kyoto Protocol architecture, and adding stronger compliance measures.</p> <p>2 points for legally binding outcome for two tracks (1 or 2 protocols), preservation of Kyoto Protocol architecture, preservation of current compliance</p> <p>1 point for supporting a legally binding outcome but insisting on only one protocol as an outcome and risking Kyoto Protocol architecture.</p> <p>0 points for undermining a multilateral approach, supporting domestic compliance only, backtracking on Kyoto Protocol architecture (particularly reporting and review).</p>
Targets that can be adjusted in line with the science	<p>The Kyoto Protocol is based on commitment periods instead of single target years. This process should be maintained because</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li data-bbox="631 885 1304 974">1. The 5-year cycle is supported by the IPCC timeline and ensures negotiators have access to the best available science. <li data-bbox="631 1009 1304 1112">2. Commitment periods should not be longer than election periods, otherwise political responsibility could fall between election cycles. <li data-bbox="631 1147 1304 1207">3. Shorter commitment periods avoid the possibility of being locked into an inadequate target for decades. <p><i>[continued]</i></p> <p>A long commitment period with a review in the middle may sound good on paper, but doesn't work in practice, which was the lesson</p>	<p>3 points for supporting 5-year commitment periods.</p> <p>2 points for supporting 8-year commitment periods, but with a strong science review clause that gives a mandate for upgrading targets during a commitment period.</p> <p>1 point for not yet having an opinion.</p> <p>0 points for supporting 8-year commitment periods or longer, or two commitment periods, without a strong science review clause that gives a mandate for upgrading targets midway.</p>

	learned in a Kyoto Protocol review process from 2005 to 2007. Countries simply weren't willing to open issues that had already been agreed for the first commitment period (2008-2012).	
National Action		
Implementing emission reductions	However good your targets are, you have to have the policies in place to meet them, and results to show the work done to date.	Greenpeace's national experts have given a grade for their country's leader on a scale of 0-10 on domestic implantation, assessing whether the country has put adequate policies in place to meet its climate targets and if the measures are sustainable. A detailed description per Head of State can be found on the Greenpeace website.
Participating in the Copenhagen Climate Summit	The Copenhagen Climate Summit is one of the most important summits of our lives – the time when leaders have promised to make a breakthrough in international climate protection. Heads of State must show leadership by coming to Copenhagen and taking the decisions that the world expects them to take.	3 points for having committed to going to Copenhagen. 2 points for considering, in public, going to Copenhagen. 1 point for not making any statements about going to Copenhagen 0 points for not going to Copenhagen being made clear.

We ranked **developing country leaders** based on following criteria:

Criteria	Why	Scoring
Emission Reduction Targets		
Emission reductions from business-as-usual (BAU) by developing countries as a group	<p>In order to have a good likelihood of staying well below 2°C temperature rise, global emissions will have to peak by 2015 and start declining rapidly thereafter. In this context, emissions of developing countries as a group – in the energy and industry sectors – should be reduced by between at least 15% to 30% below BAU predictions by 2020, conditional to support from industrialised countries.</p> <p>At the same time, global gross deforestation and associated emissions must be brought down to zero by 2020.</p>	<p>3 points for supporting long-term plans for emerging economies with at least 15% to 30 % deviation from BAU in 2020, with support from developed countries. This can be stated either in a domestic or Copenhagen context.</p> <p>2 points for supporting long-term plans for emerging economies with some deviation from BAU in 2020, with support from developed countries. This can either be stated in a domestic or Copenhagen context.</p> <p>1 point for supporting only separate Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) without any indication of the scale. Only verifying supported NAMAs. This can either be stated in a domestic or Copenhagen context.</p> <p>0 points for not supporting any national climate action.</p> <p>For forest countries like Brazil and Indonesia this category means:</p> <p>3 points: for supporting complete halt of deforestation in their country by 2020 with support from developed countries. This can be stated either in a domestic or Copenhagen context.</p> <p>2 points: for supporting at least two third reduction of deforestation in their country by 2020 with support from developed countries. This can be stated either in a domestic or Copenhagen context</p>

		<p>1 point: for supporting at least one third reduction of deforestation in their country by 2020 with support from developed countries. This can be stated either in a domestic or Copenhagen context</p> <p>0 points: for not supporting halting of deforestation in their country with support from developed countries or for not having a position on it. This can be stated either in a domestic or Copenhagen context</p>
Frequent measuring and reporting of emissions	<p>The more we know about where emissions are coming from, the more likely we are to deal with them effectively. The more trust can also be generated among countries, when one knows what the other is doing. Currently the data on developing country emissions and actions is poor and irregular.</p> <p>In the Copenhagen agreement, developing countries should agree to more regular and comparable reporting and review of their emissions and actions.</p>	<p>3 points for reporting actions with GHG inventories at least biennially.</p> <p>2 points for reporting actions with GHG inventories once in 5 years, or once for every commitment period</p> <p>1 point: for having no stated position yet</p> <p>0 points for opposing improvements to the current measuring and reporting requirements.</p>
Transparency of mitigation actions (ensuring money well spent)	<p>Climate change is too big and urgent a problem to be tackled project by project. What we need is all advanced countries in both Annex 1 and Non-Annex 1 groups to prepare long-term action plans on climate protection.</p> <p>For developing countries, Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) form the building blocks of a plan. Together, these unilateral and supported actions should add up to the substantial deviation needed from developing countries to stay well below 2°C warming.</p> <p>More expensive actions that would be taken on top of the substantial deviation could be made available for carbon markets.</p> <p>In order to assess the financial needs of developing countries and ensure that international funding is</p>	<p>3 points for supporting long-term national plans with robust measuring, reporting and verification (MRV), including international verification for supported NAMAs as well as unilateral actions</p> <p>2 points for supporting long-term plans, but international verification would apply only to supported NAMAs. Unilateral action would be verified nationally according to internationally set standards.</p> <p>1 point for supporting long-term plans, international verification only for supported NAMAs but no MRV of unilateral actions.</p> <p>0 points for not supporting long-term plans, separate NAMAs (policies, measures or projects) only.</p>

	<p>channelled into actions that would not otherwise have happened, registering and verification of both supported and unilateral actions is needed.</p> <p>This kind of transparency is also a prerequisite for functioning carbon market mechanisms – if there is room for such in the future agreement. Without improved transparency in funding as well as actions, it is difficult to build enough trust between developing and developed countries to generate the necessary financial flows for solutions.</p>	
Forest Protection		
Ambition of global forest protection	<p>This is measured only for forested developing countries, and is integrated with the question of overall national ambition.</p>	
Ensuring real and additional climate benefits	<p>The emission cuts needed to prevent catastrophic climate change are so big that we cannot pick and choose. Emission reduction from ending tropical deforestation cannot become an excuse to avoid real emission cuts in industrialised nations.</p> <p>Industrialised countries must adopt forest protection funding commitments on top of their emission reduction targets.</p> <p>Furthermore, distribution of funding should be based on national plans and national accounting instead of project-by-project funding and accounting, which simply leads to logging companies shifting their destructive activities elsewhere.</p>	<p>3 points for non-offsets financing, national accounting.</p> <p>2 points for non-offsets financing; national and sub-national approach.</p> <p>1 point for both non-offsets and offsets financing. National approach.</p> <p>0 points for a majority of funding through market offsets. National plans and sub-national projects can generate offset credits.</p>
Ensuring biodiversity within forest protection	<p>Tropical forests are essential to life; they keep climate in check, regulate water flow, and maintain the healthy ecosystems on which humanity depends.</p>	<p>3 points for a clear distinction between primary and secondary forests and plantations. Direction of REDD activities at preserving biological diversity. Strong safeguards to prevent conversion of natural forests to</p>

	<p>The forest protection mechanism established as a part of the Copenhagen agreement must not treat tropical forests only as carbon sinks. It needs to have a clear distinction between primary and secondary forests and plantations and forest protection activities must be directed at preserving biological diversity.</p>	<p>plantations in the name of REDD.</p> <p>2 points for a clear distinction between primary and secondary forests and plantations. Direction of REDD activities at preserving biological diversity.</p> <p>1 point for unclear distinction between primary and secondary forests and plantations. Uncertainty as to where money would go.</p> <p>0 points for no distinction between primary and secondary forests and plantations. Direction of REDD activities at sustainable forests management, conservation and plantations.</p>
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Guaranteeing the rights of indigenous peoples	<p>150 million indigenous people live in ancient forests worldwide. All too often they have been sidelined or subjected to human rights abuses by those intruding in their forests.</p> <p>Indigenous peoples need to have their futures secured so they can remain guardians of the forest. A climate deal must recognise and respect their rights, and directly engage local peoples in the development and implementation of its processes.</p>	<p>3 points for indigenous peoples' and other forest-dependent communities' rights being fully respected, and them being recognised as full participants in the design and implementation of REDD mechanism.</p> <p>2 points for indigenous peoples' and other forest-dependent communities' rights, as well as their participation, mentioned with indications of how these rights will be respected.</p> <p>1 point for indigenous peoples' and other forest-dependent communities' rights, as well as their participation, mentioned but no indication of how these rights will be respected.</p> <p>0 points for the rights of indigenous peoples and other forest-dependent communities not being respected.</p>
A binding deal		

<p>The agreement must be legally binding</p>	<p>Pledges won't save the climate. What we need is legally binding commitments and compliance mechanisms that have the power to impose penalties.</p> <p>The commitments for all industrialised countries must be comparable in legal nature, and have the same rules for measurement, reporting and verification. Otherwise, comparing different actions and verifying compliance will become extraordinarily complex.</p> <p>The Kyoto Protocol architecture provides a good basis for this, and needs to be preserved. It took 10 years to negotiate the Kyoto protocol and get it into force; there is no time to start lengthy negotiations about architectural issues all over again.</p>	<p>3 points for supporting a legally binding outcome from both negotiation tracks (1 or 2 protocols), keeping the Kyoto Protocol architecture, and adding stronger compliance measures.</p> <p>2 points for legally binding outcome for two tracks (1 or 2 protocols), preservation of Kyoto Protocol architecture, preservation of current compliance</p> <p>1 point for being open to having a legally binding outcome from both tracks (1 or two protocols), preservation of Kyoto Protocol architecture.</p> <p>0 points for supporting only amendments to the Kyoto Protocol and only COP decisions as an outcome from the negotiation track under convention.</p>
<p>Targets that can be adjusted in line with the science</p>	<p>The Kyoto Protocol is based on commitment periods instead of single target years. This process should be maintained because:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The 5-year cycle is supported by the IPCC timeline and ensures negotiators have access to the best available science. 2. Commitment periods should not be longer than election periods, otherwise political responsibility could fall between election cycles. 3. Shorter commitment periods avoid the possibility of being locked into an inadequate target for decades. <p>A long commitment period with a review in the middle sounds good in paper, but doesn't work in practice, which was the lesson learned with a Kyoto protocol review process from 2005 to 2007. Countries simply weren't willing to open issues that had already been agreed for the first</p>	<p>3 points for supporting 5-year commitment periods.</p> <p>2 points for supporting 8-year commitment periods, but with a strong science review clause that gives a mandate for upgrading targets during a commitment period.</p> <p>1 point for not yet having an opinion.</p> <p>0 points for supporting 8-year commitment periods or longer, or two commitment periods, without a strong science review clause that gives a mandate for upgrading targets midway.</p>

	commitment period (2008-2012).	
National emission reduction plans for 2020	However good your targets are, you have to have the policies in place to meet them, and results to show the work done to date.	Greenpeace's national experts have given a grade for their country's leader on a scale of 0-10 on domestic implantation, assessing whether the country has put adequate policies in place to meet its climate targets and if the measures are sustainable. A detailed description per Head of State can be found on the Greenpeace website.

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